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INTEGRATING MICRO AND MACRO





The 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis originated from a poor incentive
structure in the asset market derived from subprime mortgages.  The ulti-
mate bursting and unwinding of an asset bubble (here highly overvalued
real estate prices woven into a complex multilayer network of securitiza-
tion, so called collateralized debt obligations or CDOs) put enormous
stress on the financial system, spreading through the global network econ-
omy and ultimately resulting in the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression.1  Economists today agree that the severe economic fallout can
be largely attributed to the poor systemic performance of international fi-
nancial markets.2  Global macroeconomic imbalances, as well as market
failures such as excessive risk taking, misaligned incentives of rating agen-
cies, inefficient liquidity provisions within banks and systemic risk or con-
tagion, i.e., the international and inter-sectoral public goods nature of
financial stability, were not sufficiently accounted for by regulation and
international macroeconomic policy.
This combined financial and economic crisis environment not only put
the intrinsic connection between the financial and the real economy back
into the spotlight, but also opened up a policy debate about how to ensure
macroeconomic and financial stability without jeopardizing
microeconomic foundations of the real economy such as competition.  In
sum, the resulting policy challenge is twofold: First, a new and sustainable
balance between free markets, macro industrial policies, and governmental
regulation needs to be found in the financial sector, and second, strategic
interactions between macro and microeconomic policy goals need to be
identified, understood, and balanced.
This article will focus on the interaction between macroeconomic crisis
management and prudential regulatory responses on the one hand, and
competition policy and market structure on the other.  We provide a simple
economic framework for thinking about the relationship between macro
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
** Economist (Young Professionals Program), World Bank.
*** PhD Candidate, European University Institute (“EUI”), Law Department
† The Findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of
the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
1. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08
AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).
2. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, An Introduction to Financial Crises
(2007), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/07/0720.pdf.
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and micro policies as a function of the immediate policy environment, i.e.,
“extraordinary” financial instability and imminent economic crisis versus
“ordinary,” stable economic circumstances.  Specifically, we claim that—
during severe financial crises—the overall success of policy responses de-
pends on the coordination of three related decisional vectors.  First, policy
makers must coordinate the responses of multiple regulatory and political
actors.  Second, they need to follow a systematic, rather than ad hoc, ap-
proach that diminishes moral hazard and leaves open a reasonable exit
strategy.  Finally, policy makers need to consider time consistency.  In
other words, they need to avoid the temptation to excessively discount post-
crisis effects.
Overall, this work shall add structure to the ongoing policy debate and
provide conceptual guidance for lawyers and economists trying to address
the challenges of micro and macro policy integration.  In Part I, we provide
an overview of the relationship between the financial and real economic
sectors and between systemic financial stability and micro-competitive ef-
fects.  In Part II, we advance our core theoretical proposition—the strategic
complementarity of macro and micro policy levers during financial crises.
In particular, we demonstrate that policy responses that fail to consider and
balance the three key dimensions—coordination among decision-makers, a
systematic approach, and time consistency—run the risk of harming both
macro and micro-economic well-being in the long run.  Finally, in Part III,
we illustrate the quite different responses to the financial crisis of the Euro-
pean Union and the United States along the three key dimensions.  Our
goal is not to provide a comparative assessment of the two systems’ re-
sponses or a trans-Atlantic scorecard, but rather to illustrate the possibili-
ties and challenges of coordinating macro and micro responses along the
three key dimensions.
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I. FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY
In order to motivate our analysis of the interaction between micro and
macroeconomic policy in the framework of a financial and economic crisis,
we briefly outline the basic transmission between financial and real eco-
nomic activity and present a snapshot of the relationship between the two
crucial policy dimensions in focus, namely macroeconomic and financial
stability on one hand, and competition on the other.
A. The Link between the Financial and the Real Economy
Financial markets play a pivotal role in the functioning of today’s inter-
national economic system.  Real economic activity such as consumption
and investment depends on the provision and pricing of external funding
and consumers, as well as small and medium sized enterprises and large
multinationals that rely heavily on the banking sector for their financial
services.3  This market for finance, however, is characterized by informa-
tion asymmetries between lenders and borrowers that prevents direct and
complete contracting.  As a result, there is demand for an intermediate
market where financial institutions act as intermediaries providing credit
to borrowers and liquidity to depositors.  In order to evaluate individual
risk, banks will attempt to project future performance of borrowers based
upon observable financial indicators, such as firms’ or individuals’ liabili-
ties vis-a-vis income or assets (real estate or shares) and their market valu-
ation.  Expectations about risk and capacity to repay will be formed,
aggregated across potential borrowers, and translated into a more or less
diversified portfolio.  Ultimately, the choice of risk and maturity transfor-
mation—that is, a bank’s asset-liability management—will determine the
availability and pricing of debt as well as the translation of current into
future economic performance.4
In order to analyze the pass through of financial shocks to the real
economy, economists have identified various channels linking financial
markets with the rest of the economy.  These channels are outlined and
discussed in detail—for example, in Antony and Broer (2010)5—and shall
only be explained here to the extent necessary to understand the main
mechanisms involved in a financial crisis and their pass through to the real
economy.
First, the monetarist view of transmission explains the effects of mone-
tary policy on the financial sector, individual firm and consumer behavior,
3. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN RE-
TAIL BANKING 7 (2006), https://www.oecd.org/competition/sectors/39753683.pdf [hereinafter
OECD (2006)].
4. See, e.g., “Investigating the Link Between the Financial and Real Economy,” 22
BIS Papers (April 2005), especially Konstantinos Tsatsaronis, Investigating the Link Between
the Financial and Real Economy.
5. Ju¨rgen Antony & Peter Broer, Linkages between the Financial and the Real Sector
of the Economy: A Literature Survey (CPB Neth. Bureau for Econ. Policy Analysis, Docu-
ment No. 216, 2010).
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and ultimately, aggregate demand.  Figure 1 below6 provides a concise
graphical overview.  In a nutshell, a central bank can affect the reserves of
the banking sector and the money supply in the economy.  Assume a con-
tractionary monetary policy where the Fed or the ECB sells bonds/securi-
ties to decrease money supply or requires banks to hold larger shares of
their assets in liquid form; that is, cash.  Then, in order to sell the securities
to the private sector, interest rates must rise (to make holding bonds at-
tractive and create the desired demand), while increasing the reserve re-
quirement reduces banks’ loan capacity.  The immediate effects of the
operating of the interest rate and bank lending channels are lower invest-
ment (but increased saving) and consumption, and in case the long-term
real interest rate is affected, lower future output and demand for durable
goods.  Although less important here, higher interest rates also lead to
appreciating exchange rates and less competitive export industries.
FIGURE 1: FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY AND ASSET SHOCKS
TO THE REAL ECONOMY
On the other hand, financial assets and liabilities play a crucial role in
financial transmission, since (large) shocks to asset prices, rather than
monetary policy targeting inflation7 via interest rates, are frequently at the
core of financial crises.  Such was the case in 2008 (or the 1980s Japanese
asset bubble and East Asia in the 1990s).  Therefore, although Figure 1
6. Id. at 5, 16 (Figure 2.1).
7. Note that in addition to monetary policy, worldwide increasing competition in
product and labor markets (as competition drives down prices) or the “interplay of increased
global deregulation and a decreased role for governments in many economies” might have
led to low and stable inflation. K. Rogoff, Globalization and Global Disinflation 2 (Aug. 29th,
2003) (Paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City conference in Jackson
Hole, WY.).
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takes monetary policy and interest rates as the starting point of a change
in asset prices, one can look at the lower left quadrant of the graph in
isolation and focus on the link between asset prices and aggregate de-
mand, thereby paying tribute to asset markets as the origin of financial
instability and crisis.  In the words of Antony and Broer, the relative im-
portance of the interest rate channel and the credit channels changes sub-
stantially in a financial crisis.  The types of shocks that we are concerned
with primarily act through the balance sheets of agents, that is to say the
financial accelerator via the balance sheet of non-financial firms and
households and the bank capital channel via the balance sheet of commer-
cial banks.”8
Changes in asset prices affect real economic activity via three mecha-
nisms: (1) a pure wealth effect, (2) bank lending, and (3) the financial ac-
celerator,9 together often referred to as the credit channel.  The wealth
effect on non-asset consumption expenditure and finally on aggregate de-
mand in the overall economy is based upon the permanent income hy-
pothesis, where an unexpected increase in the price of an asset increases
private wealth and leads consumers to spread the gain over the remainder
of their life, ultimately causing higher consumption demand.  Consump-
tion and/or investment then goes up either through a direct liquidation of
assets by economic agents (households or firms), or via the Financial Ac-
celerator, where higher valuation of assets increases the borrowing capac-
ity and spending of otherwise liquidity constrained agents via increased
value of collateral.
The magnitude and direction of these effects depends on the liquidity
of the relevant asset markets, the degree of regulation in the financial mar-
kets, demographic distribution of asset ownership and, most importantly,
on the nature of the assets.  Given that financial markets are imperfect—
e.g., moral hazard on the side of the borrower, imperfect information on
the side of the lender, or imperfectly enforceable and incomplete credit
contracts—lenders will often require partial or full collateralization.  Then,
a negative shock to asset prices used as collateral directly decreases credit
availability, increases the risk premium on the price, affects real economic
activity, and the net worth of the borrower, which in turn accelerates by
further decreasing demand for assets and hence asset prices, etc., ulti-
mately dynamically reducing likelihood of repayment.
As far as firms and their investment decisions are concerned, changes
in asset prices, especially in share prices, do pass through to the real econ-
8. Antony & Broer, supra note 5, at 18.
9. The term financial accelerator has been introduced by Ben Bernanke, Mark Ger-
tler & Simon Gilchrist, The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 1 (1996), and elaborated by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, Credit Cycles, 105 J.
POL. ECON. 211 (1997), and has since then been found to be of significant empirical relevance
both for firms as well as consumers. For an excellent survey of the literature, see Antony &
Broer, supra note 5.
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omy mainly via Tobin’s q.  By using Tobin’s q10 to determine the optimal
amount of capital and investment, decreasing asset prices do depress in-
vestment as q decreases.  To sum up, changes in prices (or expectations
thereof) of assets such as shares or real estate not only matter for borrow-
ers’ balance sheets, i.e., firm investment and consumer borrowing capacity
(in addition to ambiguous wealth effects) over time, but may in the end
lead to severe balance sheet adjustments for lenders such as banks.  The
respective bank-lending channel at work here requires two conditions to
hold: first, banks actually cut back loans when liquidity is short, and sec-
ond, that intermediation, i.e., risk and information pooling, is an imperfect
substitute to direct contracting in the private financial market.11  Liquidity
shortage may arise due to a strong maturity mismatch between assets and
liabilities12 and/or undercapitalization preventing optimal risk portfolio
management.  Interestingly, securitization of (for example) mortgage con-
tracts allowed banks to reduce the importance of the bank lending channel
and remove illiquid loans by transforming risky individual contracts into
(theoretically) diversified bundles bearing a macro rather than micro risk.
The above-mentioned bank capitalization plays an important role regard-
ing availability of loans, as there exist regulatory constraints such as the
Basel accord requiring a minimum capitalization of banks on the one
hand, where any reduction in a bank’s net worth (e.g., due to an interest
rate change) puts pressure on its portfolio requiring either less loans or
more equity.  Lastly, it should be mentioned that the financial economy
also affects perceived and real investment return risk as well as income
risk.  Both firms and households may postpone investment or consump-
tion and enact precautionary savings in times of high uncertainty, thereby
further depressing economic performance and recovery from a recession.
In sum, financial instability can be caused by the asset as well as liabil-
ity side of a bank’s balance sheet, where the former includes bank runs or
systemic crisis and the latter refers to excessive risk taking by banks due to
moral hazard.  Both sources will be discussed in more detail and in rela-
tion to competition in the next section.  In addition to causing immediate
disruption of economic activity such as default or insolvency, it mainly
feeds through to the real economy in the form of credit constraints both
for firms and households.  The financial accelerator is activated when as-
sets used as collateral are devalued and the bank-lending channel operates
via the composition of bank balance sheets, i.e., credits may be expensive
or squeezed when banks face liquidity or capitalization constraints. In ad-
10. Tobin’s q is the ratio of market value of installed capital (i.e., the value of a firm’s
total assets) over replacement costs of the installed capital.
11. This is actually true as soon as there are information asymmetries between bor-
rower and lender, and information acquisition is costly or impossible. Banks can diversify
risk, account for maturity discrepancies, benefit from economies of scale, and scope and
lower monitoring costs due to long-run credit relationships.
12. Think of depositors requiring their money back due to a financial crisis and banks
having committed this money to long-run credits (eventually subject to default in crisis based
on bursting asset bubbles).
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dition to the direct effects on competition, the management of such insta-
bility often involves individual bank bailouts, guarantees or direct aid
packages for firms or sectors especially exposed, and thereby further am-
plifies the stability competition nexus.
B. The Link between Financial Stability and Competition
We are now in a position to focus on the potential tradeoff between
financial stability and competition in the banking sector (supply side of
finance) and, indirectly, in real economy sectors (demand side of fi-
nance).13  This analysis is key to addressing the micro and macro policy
challenges resulting from a financial and economic crisis and constitutes
the fundament for the economic framework of policy interaction proposed
in Part II.
Overall, the correlation and interaction between financial stability and
competition is complex and not clearly identified in the economic litera-
ture.14  An often-assumed negative tradeoff between competition and fi-
nancial stability is found to be too simplistic and occasional at best.15  A
2010 CEPR report titled “Bailing out the Banks: Reconciling Stability and
Competition” by Beck et al.16 states an inevitable interconnectedness be-
tween financial regulation and macro and competition policy but stresses
that “competition and stability are not incompatible” and that prudential
regulation should address the agency problems that led to excessive risk
taking while crisis management and competition policy should not only be
applied equally to all firms/banks in the market, but also account for spe-
cific features of the financial and banking sector (such as positive external-
ities of individual bank bail outs to competitors via interbank credit
contracts).  Other comprehensive analyses of the competition-stability
nexus include Carletti and Vives17 and Carletti.18  In sum, different eco-
13. Although important, the issue of sovereign debt crisis and its respective competi-
tion considerations will be left for future work.
14. In many countries, competition in the financial sector is oligopolistic, preventing
excessive competition from appearing as a primary source of the 2008 financial crisis. On the
other hand, the concentrated structure somehow contributed to the crisis as some banks were
systemically important, leading to moral hazard, perceived guarantees and excessive risk
taking.
15. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Competition and Financial Stability, 36 J.  MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING  453, 457 (June 2004).
16. THORSTEN BECK, DIANE COYLE, MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, XAVIER FREIXAS &
PAUL SEABRIGHT, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. Report, Bailing out the Banks: Recon-
ciling Stability and Competition: An Analysis of State-Supported Schemes for Financial Insti-
tutions (2010), http://www.cepr.org/meets/ltm/5575/ [hereinafter CEPR (2010)].
17. Elena Carletti & Xavier Vives, Regulation and Competition Policy in the Banking
Sector, in COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE, FIFTY YEARS OF THE TREATY OF ROME 260
(Xavier Vives ed., 2009).
18. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Com-
petition and Financial Markets: Key Findings, in OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE ROUND-
TABLE, COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (Feb. 2009). [hereinafter OECD (2009)].
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nomic theories predict positive, zero, as well as negative correlation while
empirical evidence is mixed.  Matutes and Vives, for example, find that
there exist multiple banking equilibria, which represent different possible
levels of stability in the sector.  The instability here derives from coordina-
tion problems among depositors with differing expectations regarding the
quality of banks.  These expectations can become self-fulfilling and confi-
dence crises or even no banking at all may result completely independent
of market structure (number of banks).19
Correlations and potential tradeoffs between competition and stability,
however, will most likely be nonlinear, which led Allen and Gale to iden-
tify welfare as the fuel of analysis and approach this question by taking a
welfare economic perspective, i.e., by asking the crucial question of what
are efficient levels of competition and financial stability? Any sensible an-
swer to this question will, above all, depend on the theoretical framework
and its underlying assumptions.  In an Arrow Debreu general equilibrium
framework, Allen and Gale20 transpose the relationship between competi-
tion and efficiency established by the fundamental theorems of welfare
into a world with financial crisis and find that “perfect competition is com-
patible with the efficient level of financial stability.  In this sense, there is
no “tradeoff” between competition and stability.”21  Market frictions such
as transaction costs and asymmetric information justify the existence of
financial intermediation and allow banks to improve risk sharing and li-
quidity provision.  The above result then is derived when banks can write
perfectly contingent and incentive-compatible contracts (a scenario where
banks only write contracts they can fulfill, i.e., there is no incentive to ac-
count for default) as well as (and more realistically) when they have to
rely on incomplete contracts.  The key here is that, with incomplete con-
tracting, banks will take the possibility of default into account, actually
attach some positive probability to such an event, and integrate such risk
within their optimal strategy.  Then a system of potential liquidation of a
bank’s assets towards its investors and creditors emerges ex ante (in the
case of complete markets and completely collateralized Arrow securities).
In sum, both competition and financial instability here are necessary for
(constrained) efficiency, while government intervention might still be de-
sirable if one thinks of extra costs such as unemployment and bankruptcy
costs.  Furthermore, this result points towards market failures at the heart
of empowering financial instability and the occurrence of crisis/default to
be socially undesirable, while competition and the general financial mar-
ket structure do not pose a threat to welfare.
19. In this model expectations lead to beliefs which lead to margins and market shares
which ultimately determine the quality/probability of success of a bank (A larger bank with
more depositors can better diversify). See Carmen Matutes & Xavier Vives, Competition for
Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 184 (Apr. 1996).
20. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Intermediaries and Markets, 72
ECONOMETRICA 1023 (July 2004).
21. Allen & Gale, supra note 15, at 457.
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Within a partial equilibrium framework, where asymmetric informa-
tion introduces agency costs to the system, an actual tradeoff between
competition (i.e., the number of banks or charters) and financial stability
emerges.  The simple principle of operation is that increasing competition
reduces individual banks’ profits and boosts risk-taking incentives.  The
problem of moral hazard emerges when banks are debt financed and bank
managers, acting on behalf of shareholders, stand to benefit from the up-
side of risky business while not bearing its downside of losing debt (here
deposits).  This is often referred to as limited liability due to some form of
deposit insurance, guarantee, or lending of last resort based on “too large
or too interconnected to fail” considerations by a central bank.  Growing
competition—here modeled as the ratio of banks over supply of funds/
depositors—can aggravate this problem by shifting the distribution of po-
tential profits across risk downwards—often referred to as reducing the
charter value of a bank—thereby increasing the incentive to take addi-
tional risk and exploit the absence of any convexity that the cost of default
on debt would normally bring about.
Similarly, from a dynamic perspective, banks already in trouble due to
partial or complete erosion of their margins might engage in similarly ex-
cessive risk taking, as outlined above and often referred to as “gambling
for resurrection.”  In a nutshell, banks choose a rate of return on their
investments or loans that is negatively correlated with the probability of
success (=1/risk) subject to two equilibrium conditions: First, the average
cost of funds must be equal to the expected return on investments, and
second, the expected return on investments should be maximized.  Clearly,
the more competitive the market, i.e., the more banks there are relative to
the supply of deposits/funds, the higher the price and smaller the individ-
ual bank’s disposal of those funds, the lower the profits, and hence, the
higher the required return on the deposits and the corresponding choice of
risk.  Ultimately, if one assumes a given supply of funds, it is found that
the optimal number of banks in the market is clearly below the free entry
level.22  If there is not only competition in the market for deposits and
banks actually do not invest deposits themselves but hand out loans to
entrepreneurs or firms that themselves choose how to invest, competition
in the banking sector, which at the same time is then a market for loans,
actually leads to a positive correlation between competition and financial
stability. Although entrepreneurs have the same objective function as
banks and are in theory subject to the identical low-profit-high-risk trade
off, competition among banks reduces interest on loans and thereby in-
creases profitability, ultimately reducing risk taking and stabilizing the
whole financial system from the bottom up.23
22. Id. at 465.
23. This result has been shown by John H. Boyd & Gianni De Nicolo´, The Theory of
Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited, 60 J. FIN. 1329 (June 2005), who also under-
lined that, given the banking market is a truly intermediary platform, the beneficial stability
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Similarly, in dynamic set ups, when banks consider the effects of choice
of risk in the short and medium run, competition may very well increase
and decrease stability.  In other words, risky investments may lead to large
changes in market share while prudential ones may avoid them.  Then, if
banks have small market shares as the market is competitive, they may
want to avoid risk out of fear of going permanently out of business (ab-
sorbing barriers) or face increasing returns to scale and risk (reflective
barriers; i.e., although their market share temporarily becomes 0, they will
eventually bounce back).  At the other end of the spectrum, i.e., with large
market shares (low competition), a reflective barrier implies prudential
bank lending while an absorbing one will incentivize large risk taking.
Insights on the nexus between competition and macro stability can be
derived from various other perspectives.  We focus here on three: (1) spa-
tial competition, (2) Schumpeterian competition, as well as (3) systemic
considerations.  First, spatial competition introduces heterogeneity in fi-
nancial products due to bank location or quality differences, where search
or information acquisition is costly and frictions in the form of lock-in may
arise.  The main finding of this line of work is that organizational (indus-
trial) structure matters for efficiency and financial stability.  While small
unitary banks (i.e., one bank that consists of one branch in one location)
have a strong incentive to exploit local monopoly and charge high prices,
large branch banks (i.e., one bank that features many branches in different
locations) may want to compete for future business in different locations
and for different product lines, hence avoiding classical lock-in.  In this
sense, competition among banks may not be efficient.24  Regarding stabil-
ity, competition may entail diversification and risk pooling when one bank
is allowed to occupy various locations; however, the exact structure of lo-
cation (e.g., alternating versus adjacent) will determine whether there is a
tradeoff (adjacent locations again provide local market power) or not (al-
ternating locations do not affect competition and allow stability through
diversification without loss of competition).  Ultimately, switching costs do
play an important role in reality and weaken such theoretic results regard-
ing market structure.25
effect of loan market competition may dominate the detrimental one of deposit market
competition.
24. Empirical evidence from a US-Canada comparison between 1920 and 1980 by
Bordo, Rockoff, and Redish (1993), as well as by Carlson and Mitchener (2006), confirm that
branch banking generally is more competitive. See generally Michael D. Bordo, Hugh Rock-
off, & Angela Redish, A Comparison of the United States and Canadian Banking Systems in
the Twentieth Century: Stability vs. Efficiency? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 4546, 1993); see also Mark Carlson & Kris James Mitchener, Branch Banking,
Bank Competition, and Financial Stability, 38 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1293–1328,
(Aug. 2006).
25. Such switching costs have been repeatedly found to be important. See, e.g., OECD
(2006), supra note 3.
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Second, Schumpeter26 argued that innovation is driven by the incen-
tive to acquire market power and monopoly rents, and ultimately, cumu-
lates in a dynamic system of creative destruction.  When transposing this
idea into the framework of financial markets, it immediately becomes
clear that financial stability here may not be consistent with efficient wel-
fare provision.  In a “winner takes all” world, where banks first choose
how to invest into the development of a financial product and then com-
pete in prices, only one monopolist bank survives each period.  Although
this is an extreme form of instability, this bank will be the most innovative
bank producing the best (highest payoff) product while charging an aggre-
gate price premium that exactly equals the social value of its innovation,
hence producing allocative efficiency.  Here competition clearly produces
financial instability and optimal welfare at the same time.  In case banks
are provided local or regional monopolies via regulation, welfare will be
suboptimal as investment will be either too high or too low (i.e., either the
less innovative bank(s) are guaranteed positive profits or the most innova-
tive bank is stripped of its monopoly profits.)27
Last but not least, the systemic nature of the financial and banking
sector gives rise to important insights regarding competition and stability.
This perspective is especially instructive when comparing the impact of
crisis management and bank bailouts in the financial sector with its coun-
terparts in real economic sectors such as the automotive industry.  Econo-
mists usually refer to “contagion” or “systemic risk” when describing
detrimental network dynamics in the financial economy.  Due to the na-
ture of interbank relations and the respective channels, above all the credit
channel and payment systems we have described in Part I that link banks
with consumers, firms and other banks, a small shock such as insolvency of
one bank (e.g., Lehman Brothers) can affect the whole market, leading to
a domino effect resembling the spreading of a virus through a blood circu-
lation system.  Such contagion is well-documented and researched in the
economic literature, but can academics actually establish a systematic cor-
relation between competition and financial fragility? That is to ask; is it
possible to identify the possibility, speed and strength of contagion as a
function of market structure and competitive environment?  In a competi-
tive banking sector, each bank has a relatively small market share, acts as
a price taker assuming that its actions are not affecting the market equilib-
rium, and therefore, takes its decisions in isolation and has no incentive to
provide liquidity to any troubled or bankrupt competitor.  If, on the other
hand, there are only a limited number of banks, they will act strategically,
taking account of the potential effects of contagion and thereby having a
strong incentive to provide liquidity to the insolvent competitor by forgo-
ing immediate execution of debt, prolonging its maturity, or even forgiving
a fraction thereof.
26. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed.
1950).
27. See Allen & Gale, supra note 15, at 456–57.
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This scenario entails an obvious private-provision-of-public-goods
problem.  Financial stability is the relevant public good, and a coordina-
tion problem prevents banks from providing the necessary liquidity to
competitors in order to stabilize the whole system.28  The more banks
compete in the market and the stronger the information asymmetries and
market frictions involved, the less likely a cooperative equilibrium may be
achieved and/or sustained.29  This systemic component of financial mar-
kets, including currency, inter-bank and capital markets, however, repre-
sents a double-edged sword in the sense that, on the one hand, shocks
spread easily and eventually build up to a crisis and complete shut down,
but on the other hand, crisis management may take advantage of the net-
work structure and macro stabilization may be achieved without jeopard-
izing competition policy goals.  Individual bailouts or national guarantees
among others are ultimately not only profiting the receiving institution
and increasing its competitiveness, but also may represent a positive exter-
nality for the whole system, including: competitors that hold stakes in the
receiving bank as creditors, business partners, or reputational concerns
eventually affecting the whole industry (investor behavior, irrational stock
trading, panics, self-fulfilling prophecies or bank runs.)30  Acknowledg-
ment of these ambiguous dynamics underlines the special nature of the
financial sector and will be essential when analyzing strategic interaction
between micro and macro policy.
In sum, the diverse economic literature on competition and financial
stability as well as related empirical evidence informing research and pol-
icy making alike reflect a historical component.  Views on competition in
the banking sector have changed along with lessons learned or new in-
sights derived during episodes of crisis, where deregulation in the U.S.
banking sector during the 1970s and 80s magnified the agency problem
(deriving from U.S. deposit insurance introduced in 1934) and led to a
dramatic increase in bank failures.31  Beck et al.32 generalized this result
by using data on sixty-nine countries from 1980 to 1997 and finding “that
crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems
28. The same logic applies to the current sovereign debt crisis and the coordination of
countries such as stable Euro area members (e.g., Germany) helping out a troubled periphery
(i.e., Greece et al).
29. See, e.g., Lawrence Sa´ez & Xianwen Shi, Liquidity Pools, Risk Sharing and Finan-
cial Contagion, 25 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 5 (2004); Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, Provision
of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions, 56 REV. ECON.
STUD. 583 (Oct. 1989).
30. Note that bank runs and panics can be driven by fundamentals, i.e., the business
cycle, but also by irrational expectations based on those fundamentals. Hence, whether bank
runs occur largely depends on equilibrium selection in a multiple equilibrium environment
and therefore constitutes a problem for preventive policymaking.
31. See Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 1183, 1184–85 (Dec. 1990).
32. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Ross Levine, Bank Concentration, Compe-
tition, and Crises: First Results, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 1581 (May 2006).
Spring 2018] Integrating Micro and Macro Policy Levers 203
even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory poli-
cies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic condi-
tions, and shocks to the economy.”  Based on such findings, competition
policy in the financial sector often gave rise to exceptions, such as the ex-
emption of banking from competition policy (the Competition Act of
1998) in the Netherlands until 2000 or even curiosities such as the fact that
competition policy in banking in Italy actually was conducted by the Bank
of Italy until 2005.33  While a mix of tight regulation (e.g., of rates) and
complacency with collusion or special competition rules in the EU banking
sector has been substituted by full applicability of merger regulations (e.g.,
Portugal in 2003 or France with the Credit Lyonnais/Credit Agricole
merger decision of the French Supreme Court, also in 2003) and a tough
stance against cartels (such as the Austrian “Lombard” Club in 1996 or
payment system cases such as VISA 2007) and abuse of dominant position,
the United States has ended banking exemptions from antitrust with vari-
ous Supreme Court decisions (1944, 1963, and 1964) but still retains
merger regulations where the critical upper bound Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) remains higher for banks than other firms.34  However, also
in European (Art. 21(3) of the merger regulation), Swiss, and Canadian
merger proceedings the possibility of overriding competition considera-
tions due to stability concerns continues to exist.  In addition, the Euro-
pean Union maintains state aid provisions, where both stability and
competition considerations directly interact with each other and which,
due to the nature of crisis management, became the reference framework
for coordination of EU macro and micro policy in response to the 2008
financial meltdown.35
To conclude this section, we return to its starting point, namely the
question of social welfare. We have found that competition may reduce
financial stability and hence create a welfare tradeoff, but this result by no
means can claim generality or robustness.  But even if we followed many
of the above-mentioned policy makers in believing that there is a clear-cut
negative tradeoff between competition and stability, the prioritization of
stability over competition concerns does not automatically follow.  The ini-
tial question regarding optimal competition and stability levels can be re-
phrased by asking: what is the welfare tradeoff between concentration and
financial instability?  Policy makers should ask: what is costlier to society
and/or with respect to a policy target?
Overall, competition encourages efficient and innovative financial ser-
vices, while stability is essential to the systemic trust on which the sector
depends.  Costs of financial crisis and related economic output loss/reces-
sions are both large and very visible due to their sudden emergence and
their confinement to short periods of time.  Efficiency costs deriving from
imperfect competition are less spectacular in size and hence less visible or
33. Carletti & Vives, supra note 17.
34. See id. at 11.
35. See infra Part III.A.
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consciously perceived (and also more difficult to measure); however, they
are longer lasting and arise continuously over large periods of time.  In
sum, there are substantial efficiency gains to be achieved via increased
competition.  This just shows that the question of prioritizing policies in
case of negative correlation is a difficult one in itself; however, as we will
argue, it can be foregone due to strategic complementarity (and not sub-
stitutability) of competition and macro policies as well as prudential
regulation.
II. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY INTEGRATION
The fundamental idea behind our framework to analyze policy integra-
tion is the strategic interaction between different governmental interven-
tions.  Policies rarely can or should be executed in complete isolation from
each other as they affect the payoff structure of other policies.  Policy
targets often are subject to cross-policy effects and welfare tradeoffs.
Hence, in game theoretic terms, one enters the world of Nash equilibria,
where equilibrium strategies of a microeconomic policy maker (e.g., a
competition authority or government department) must take account of
any eventual policies taken by its macroeconomic counterpart (e.g., a trea-
sury, banking regulator, central bank or even nation state) and vice versa.
Even more so, it very often will be the case that optimal policymaking
must account for strategic interactions and that eventually one integrated
(or coordinated) policy strategy should be adopted to achieve an optimal
mix of policy goals.  In the case of macro stabilization and competition
policy the unit in which payoffs are measured is welfare; however, it is not
necessarily the same distributional preference (here total versus consumer
welfare) that unites the respective policymakers.
A. Strategic Policy Substitutability and Complementarity
According to Bulow et al.,36 two products are called strategic substi-
tutes (complements) when more aggressive play in the form of lower
prices or higher quantity produced by one firm in a given market de-
creases (increases) marginal profitability of a competing firm in the same
market.37  The adaptation to policymaking follows as such: instead of prof-
its, we can think of a competition and financial authority’s respective ob-
jective—e.g., some measure(s) of social welfare resulting from competition
W(C) or financial/macro stability W(M)—and instead of choosing quanti-
ties or prices as strategic variables, we assume regulation or active policies
such as bail outs, guarantees, bad asset acquisition, or enforcement of
competition rules, including fines or prohibition of mergers.  Let us denote
competition policy as P(C) and macro stabilization as P(M). Then, a com-
36. Jeremy I. Bulow, John D. Geanakoplos & Paul D. Klemperer, Multimarket Oli-
gopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements, 93 J. POL. ECON. 488 (June 1985).
37. Note that classic substitutes or complements refer to total costs or payoffs rather
than marginal changes.
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petition authority will regard its policy as a strategic substitute to
macroeconomic policy if
(1)
i.e., if a marginal increase in financial stabilization by a central bank or
government reduces the marginal increase (effectiveness) of competition
policy in terms of its policy target—here, for example, consumer welfare.
If (1) were positive, the policies would be strategic complements, and
macro policy would reinforce its competition counterpart.
In case we assume symmetry, the same logic will apply from the per-
spective of a macro policymaker; for example, a central bank would con-
sider its policy to be a strategic complement if
i.e., an increase/tightening in competition policy would actually reinforce
macro/stabilization policies.  It follows that, in theory, the optimal re-
sponse of a competition authority to more macro stabilization in presence
of strategic substitutability will be to reduce its own policy efforts (again
the same holds true from the perspective of a macro policymaker), while a
central bank may find it optimal to increase its efforts in response to
tighter competition policy in case of strategic complementarity.  It must,
however, be noted at this point that we assume that competition policy
actually always increases competition, while macro policy always increases
financial and/or macroeconomic stability.  Furthermore, given our analysis
in Part I and the conclusion that there most likely are some welfare
(Pareto) optimal, intermediate levels of competition and stability, the ab-
solute position on the spectrum of both competition and financial stability
will crucially determine the sign of the respective strategic effects of pol-
icy.  In other words, macro policy can act as a complementary force to
competition policy up until the optimal level of competition where it actu-
ally starts to reverse its effect on the marginal efficiency of tighter compe-
tition policy.  This is a logical conclusion because the policy outcome
dimension here is welfare and beyond optimal levels of competition and
stability, the direction of marginal policy towards the welfare target
changes its sign, i.e., a negative change (reduction) in competition and sta-
bility defines the “new” policies P(M) and P(C).  Note also that nothing
will change in the strategic relationship between policies if both policy-
makers operate in a world of too much stability and competition at the
same time (see Figure 2).  The key role of welfare as the unifying policy
target dimension in this framework complements its general importance in
the analysis of the competition-stability interaction as stressed by Allen
and Gale (2004).
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FIGURE 2: STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY IN RELATION TO WELFARE
B. Strategic Policy Interaction in the Crisis Context
In order to apply our framework of policy interaction to the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis in a structured and coherent manner, we will order our dis-
cussion along the timeline.  We identify a sequence of three periods (pre-
crisis, actual crisis, and post-crisis) as well as three policy dimensions/
levers (competition policy, macroeconomic policy/crisis management, and
prudential regulation).  In the pre-crisis world, macroeconomic policy,
mainly in the form of interest rate and monetary policy, mostly was con-
ducted independently of any competition considerations or had priority
over competition considerations due to the perceived negative correlation,
discussed above.  Furthermore, any active policymaking in the financial
sector took place against the background of a regulatory framework that
proved to be incapable of providing the correct balance between risk and
the search for return, ultimately leading to a crisis situation.38  The depth
and breadth of the adverse effects, as well as the speed of contagion re-
quired an immediate response in the form of bank bailouts, capital provi-
sion by central banks, and ultimately the taxpayer, guarantees, the
creation of bad banks, as well as the exchange of liquidity for toxic assets
by public authorities and central banks or supportive fiscal and monetary
policy in general.  All these measures can be summarized as
“macroeconomic crisis management” and refer to active policymaking
with some limited time horizon.  However, they not only support the fi-
nancial economy’s quest to re-stabilize (re-liquidize), but also have strong
repercussions for market structure and competition in the banking sector,
as well as the availability and pricing of financial services to other sectors,
both in the short and medium run.  Vice versa, any competition policy
during the crisis immediately interacts with the a.o. stabilization mecha-
nisms, most obviously when it comes to the supervision of mergers, acqui-
sitions, as well as the chosen selection/distribution mechanism, timing and
respective incentive structures of bail out programs.  In short, the nature
of macro intervention and stabilization immediately creates an environ-
38. See OECD (2009), supra note 18.
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ment of strategic policy interaction with competition policy (see Figure 3
for an overview).
Time 2: CRISIS 3: POST 1: PRE 







FIGURE 3: A TIMELINE OF POLICY INTERACTION
Post-crisis levels of stability and competition are determined by the exit
strategy chosen from the crisis management regime as well as the re-
formed prudential regulatory framework.39  In a way, the regulatory
framework constitutes a mechanism able to fine-tune the co-existence of
competition and stability in the long run and to achieve complementarity
between macro management and competition policy in the short and me-
dium run.  Although the most popular regulatory instrument was a mini-
mum capital requirement for banks—such as the 1988 Basel Accord—to
reduce incentives for risk taking and moral hazard,40 it has been shown
that additional regulation such as deposit rate controls were necessary to
achieve Pareto (welfare) efficient outcomes.41  Other so-called safety net
provisions, such as deposit insurance or lending of last resort, aggravate
risk taking incentives and moral hazard and need to be complemented by
corrective regulation.  Overall, well-designed regulation can provide for a
competitive and financially stable level playing field; however, if uneven
across economies or states, it may act as a barrier to competition that is
already complicated by asymmetric information, switching costs, and net-
work economies.42
39. Regulation did not achieve the correct balance between risk and the search for
return.
40. See CEPR (2010), supra note 16.
41. Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Liberalization,
Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 147 (Mar. 2000).
42. See Carletti & Vives, supra note 17, at 4.
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We see that policies differ in type and duration, allowing us to distin-
guish two broad “policy levers.”  On the one hand, there is prudential reg-
ulation constituting the long-term framework or “base lever” within which
other policies interact.  On the other hand, there are macroeconomic poli-
cymaking and its special short-term branch—crisis management—as well
as competition policy, the “action levers.”  By now we have established
that crisis management directly affects competition (policy) due to its na-
ture (again, think of EU State Aid provisions as part of competition pol-
icy).  The strategic interaction between these policies will depend on
whether the regulatory environment is sufficiently capable of accounting
for adverse incentives towards risk taking, thereby allowing bank bailouts
and guarantees to stabilize the economy without jeopardizing competition
in the banking sector and indirectly, through the availability and pricing of
finance, in the real economy.  Then, the issue becomes to which extent
stability considerations should or have to influence competition policy de-
sign and vice versa.
At this point it seems important to point out that competition issues in
the real economy—even if real economic sectors such as the energy sector
resemble financial markets via trading financial instruments—crucially dif-
fer from those in the financial economy due to the absence of systemic
risk.  It follows that bailouts are, ceteris paribus, more likely to support
already weak and potentially inefficient firms as network dynamics inher-
ent in the interbank lending machinery are absent.  Bailouts, in most sec-
tors, then, signal that there has been overcapacity in the market, and
conditions of reduced activity by bailed out firms can be required for sus-
tained competition while in the banking sector the fear of too little activity
and the freeze of “inter-banking” was the main driver for macro manage-
ment and positive externalities.  As outlined above, this can lead to com-
plicated effects and regulatory challenges.  Following this line of thought,
the EU Markets in Financial Instruments directive applied to the energy
sector (gas and electricity), for example, would have negative effects on
competition as SMEs would not find it feasible to hold large amounts of
equity or establish an in-house bank that executes trading on the interna-
tional energy markets.  As a result, prices in gas, electricity, and other
commodities such as metal or food would increase.43
In sum, a post-crisis regime will depend on the division of labor be-
tween prudential regulation, macro policy, and competition policy, where
strategic complementarity between competition policy and macro/crisis
management could derive from a solid understanding of the special fea-
tures of the banking sector as well as from prudential regulation that not
only levels the playing field but also efficiently solves the moral hazard
problem of excessive risk taking related to bail outs, too big to fail consid-
erations, LOLR, and the basic information asymmetry in the financial
economy.  This mix will determine whether we are actually going forward
into or back to the future.  Ultimately, the degree of complementarity
43. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, xx (Aug. 2011).
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achieved through the prudential regulatory framework of choice will de-
termine whether the focus must be on a welfare optimal balance between
competition and macro policies or competition and financial stability actu-
ally mutually reinforce each other.  Along these lines, a 2009 OECD re-
port summarizes as follows: Because regulatory failure led to the crisis, the
main solutions will come from prudential regulation and other measures
that change incentives, not from competition policy. Competition authori-
ties do have a role to play in ensuring that exit strategies are built into
rescue interventions so as to prevent them from harming competition in
the longer term and hindering recovery.  This last statement refers to the
careful design of crisis management and the respective exit strategies
previsioned by policy makers so as to stabilize the financial economy with-
out creating long-term competitive distortions and effects.  This exit from
large-scale crisis management, i.e., the unwinding of extraordinary liquid-
ity provisions, guarantees, and public capital holdings,44 constitutes with-
out doubt the second main issue besides prudential regulatory reform
when it comes to determining the future framework of competition and
stability in the financial sector.
The evaluation of strategic interaction between active policy levers in
the United States and the European Union will be the focus of Part III.
However, before identifying similarities and differences in policy frame-
work and approach on both sides of the Atlantic, we will shortly spell out
the three key dimensions that we believe to constitute the backbone of any
comprehensive analysis (and efficient design) of crisis and post-crisis pol-
icy interaction.
C. The Emergence of Three Analytic Key Dimensions
Given the above framework, three key dimensions of policy integra-
tion naturally emerge and will serve as the structural backbone of our
comparative analysis of the EU and US policy response to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis.  These key dimensions are (1) coordination, (2) systematic ap-
proach, and (3) time consistency.  In some way, they correspond to a
three-dimensional construct of the policy space, where different actors in-
teract and influence each others’ strategies and payoffs, different system-
atic linkages exist between qualitatively distinct boxes such as competition
and macroeconomic stability, and where this whole system is dynamic,
changes its fundaments over time, and current actions should account for
their repercussions regarding future outcomes.  In short, coordination and
systemic responses derive from the need for policy integration, while time
44. See OECD (2009), supra note 18. Like the initial interventions, the sale by the
state of stakes in financial firms back to the private sector and the lifting of guarantees have
great potential to distort competition. Exit strategies that protect and promote competition
are therefore essential, both when designing interventions and when phasing them out. Exit
strategy issues for competition include dealing with (a) mergers of large financial institutions,
(b) barriers to entry in financial markets, (c) the sale of government stakes and (d) ending
government support.
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consistency will be essential due to the particular timing of events, policies,
and their targets and effects.
From the above analysis, it should be clear that there exists some cor-
relation between competition and financial stability.  Given that welfare
should be the common goal of all policy makers and their actions strategi-
cally interact in determining this outcome, coordination among different
policy makers—both technical agencies as well as sovereign states or gov-
ernment departments—will be highly desirable and even necessary in or-
der to tackle a crisis efficiently and create an optimal post-crisis
environment.  For example, the level of supervision, its degree of
(de)centralization, as well as the coherence of various policy targets will be
decisive in determining the efficiency of measures and policies taken
across Europe and the United States following the 2008–09 Global Finan-
cial Crisis. With respect to the European situation, an array of well-known
economists points out that “coordination costs between national regula-
tors, both in terms of resources, but perhaps in the context of a systemic
crisis more importantly in terms of time, call for a coordinated or central-
ized intervention and resolution authority.”45
Systematic approach refers to both policy integration and some related
timing issues. Here the different systematic features of the financial and
real economic sectors as outlined in Parts I and II.B will be important
(potentially positive versus negative externalities of uneven intervention).
Furthermore, the interplay between immediate crisis management, pru-
dential regulation, and competition policy must be accounted for in a sys-
tematic manner as suggested in Part II.B.  While an ad hoc approach to
crisis management increases moral hazard as opposed to a systematic one,
the short-run tax burden might also be lower.  From an ex ante perspec-
tive, bailout systems should avoid the creation or amplification of moral
hazards in the future, as this was the very behavior at the core of building
up instability in the first place.  With a view to an efficient ex post policy
regime, many economists emphasize the highly complementary role of
adapting prudential regulation to this end.46
Time consistency focuses on the dynamic dimension of the systematic
approach, i.e., identifying and aligning short-run and long-run effects of
policy.  Crisis management often is subject to a severe discounting of the
middle and long run due to the above outlined perception of financial in-
stability being much more costly and pressing than continuous efficiency
losses due to imperfect competition.  However, achieving short-run targets
does not necessarily come at the cost of jeopardizing long-run incentives.
We now turn to an examination of EU and U.S. responses to the recent
financial crisis and evaluate them across the three key dimensions.
45. See CEPR (2010), supra note 16, at 75.
46. Id.
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III. EU AND U.S. RESPONSES ALONG THE THREE VECTORS
The 2008–09 financial crisis rolled out chaotically and, at terms, virtu-
ally cataclysmically.  It is tempting to judge the crisis responses of key gov-
ernmental decision-makers from the perspective of the relatively serene
aftermath, forgetting that they were in some sense muddling through the
fog of war.  Our point here is not to judge the overall success of the policy
responses in balancing micro and macro economic factors.  Rather, it is to
evaluate the extent to which policy makers seemed to take into account
the three major dimensions—coordination, systematization, and time-con-
sistency—and to illustrate the significance of the three dimensions.
By comparing the responses in the European Union and the United
States, we do not mean to try to pick a winner.  Regulators and policy
actors on the two sides of the Atlantic were operating under quite differ-
ent institutional structures and economic and political constraints.  Our
comparison is limited to considering what was done and, in comparative
perspective, what was possible.
A. EU Responses
1. Coordination
The European Union as a political, supranational entity interacts with
its Member States through a variety of legal and economic channels.47
The two treaties in force at the time of the crisis—the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union and the Treaty of the European Community (now rolled into
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”))48—con-
figured a legal framework allowing for a number of possible responses,
ranging from single member state to fully coordinated actions.49  The cho-
sen responses depended less on treaty requirements than on voluntary un-
dertakings by the Member States and, therefore, on the political and
economic circumstances at the time.50
The aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy made clear that the magnitude
of the crisis called for a unanimous European voice.  The European Coun-
cil of Economic and Finance Ministers not only endorsed a full commit-
ment to backing up European financial institutions, but also stressed the
need to coordinate at the EU level while recognizing that most of the ac-
47. On the characteristics of the European Union and its functioning, see generally
JOHN MCCORMICK, THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS AND POLICIES (2008).
48. “The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. It provides the EU
with modern institutions and optimised working methods to tackle both efficiently and effec-
tively today’s challenges in today’s world. In a rapidly changing world, Europeans look to the
EU to address issues such as globalisation, climatic and demographic changes, security and
energy. The Treaty of Lisbon reinforces democracy in the EU and its capacity to promote the
interests of its citizens on a day-to-day basis.” See Treaty of Lisbon, EUROPA, http://eu-
ropa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
49. See id. 271 et seq.
50. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Immediate Responses to Financial Tur-
moil–Council Conclusions (Oct. 7, 2008).
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tual measures would be implemented at the national level.51  On the one
hand, this approach implied a multilevel coordinated action between the
European Union and its Member States and, on the other, required insti-
tutional coordination within the political and the technical branch of the
European Union itself—represented by the European Council and the
European Commission, respectively.  Therefore, following the ECOFIN
declaration, the European Council was left with the task of solving the
anticipated coordination problems by enacting a mechanism ensuring pol-
icy continuity, (i.e., coherence with the internal markets policies), as well
as flexibility, transparency, and respect of free market competition.52  Yet,
the national dimension of most banks required Member States to play the
leading role53 when designing both general schemes and ad hoc interven-
tions.  Facing a major risk of internal market distortions due to negative
cross-border/spill-over effects, the European Commission had to assume
the crucial task of leveling the playing field through the implementation of
a community-wide legal framework.54
2. Systematic Approach
Built upon Article 107 of the TFEU, the general legal framework cho-
sen to enact a coordinated European response to the financial crisis was to
be found in the rules preventing a distortion of competition through the
granting of public money, the so-called state aids.  Importantly, then, the
implementation of the crisis response was sifted through a legal filter in-
tended to protect micro-competitive distortions.
Although Article 107.1 of the TFEU generally forbids state aids that
(1) distort competition and (2) affect trade between Member States,55
some exceptions to this prohibition are made (Article 107.2 TFEU),56 in-
cluding the circumstances under which an exemption for a specific state
51. Id. (“We agree to coordinate closely in our actions and to take into consideration
potential cross-border effects of national decisions. We agree that public intervention has to
be decided at national level in a coordinated framework.”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Neelie Kroes, Competition Policy and the Crisis–The Commission’s Approach to
Banking and Beyond, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL., at 3 (2010).
55. TFEU Article 107.1 (“Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted
by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the
common market.”).
56. Id. Article 107.2 (“The following shall be compatible with the common market: (a)
aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is
granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; (b) aid to
make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; (c) aid
granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the
division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the eco-
nomic disadvantages caused by that division.”).
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aid may be granted (Article 107.3 TFEU).57  Thus, Article 107. 3, section
(c) establishes the legal basis to allow state aid in individual cases: “aid to
facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain eco-
nomic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to
an extent contrary to the common interest.”  While section (b) represents
an exceptional ground applicable on a general basis and therefore ulti-
mately chosen as the legal basis to enact the financial crisis regulation:
“aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of cer-
tain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading con-
ditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.”58
As outlined in the case law, the definition of a state aid implies four
cumulative elements: (1) it must be public money; (2) it must confer an
advantage to the recipient; (3) it must be selective; and (4) it must imply
an effect on trade or a distortion of competition.59  Additionally, on the
basis of the 2004 Guidelines on state aids for firms in difficulties,60 a major
distinction between rescue, i.e., short-term aid,61 and restructuring, i.e.,
long-term aid, has to be made.  While the first is designed to keep afloat a
firm during a maximum period of six months (defined as both temporary
and reversible), restructuring aid implies a much wider commitment (char-
acterized as permanent and irreversible) and thus is necessarily accompa-
nied by a restructuring plan.62  However, regardless of the form, an aid
granted to a firm in difficulties must be in any case appropriate to fulfill its
objectives and restricted to the necessary and proportional minimum.63
57. Id. Article 107.3 (“The following may be considered to be compatible with the
common market: (a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard
of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; (b) aid to promote
the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; (c) aid to facilitate the development of cer-
tain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest; (d) aid to promote
culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and com-
petition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest; (e) such
other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission.”).
58. The 1995 decision on Credit Lyonnais opened the door for such use in case of a
systemic crises. See Case 95/547/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 1995 giving conditional
approval to the aid granted by France to the bank Cre´dit Lyonnais [1995]  OJ L 308 , 21/12/
1995 p 92 - 119 at Section 3.2. For a summary of the decision, see Press Release, European
Comm’n, Credit Lyonnais: Commission Approves the French Government’s Aid Plan in Re-
turn for a Serious “Slimming Cure” (July 26, 1995) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/95/829&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLan
guage=EN.
59. For a detailed discussion on the relevant cases and their interpretation see P. M.
ROTH, ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION 1505 et seq (2008).
60. Commission Communication, 2004 O.J. C 244/2 (Community Guidelines on State
Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty).
61. Short term aid refers to a period of up to six months. Id. ¶ 15.
62. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
63. Id. ¶ 40.
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Starting with Northern Rock in 2007,64 the Commission acted on the
basis of Article 107.3(c) and the 2004 Guidelines in order to approve a
series of individual measures designed to rescue firms in difficulties.65
However, the fall of Lehman affected not only firms in difficulties, but also
perfectly sound institutions simply unable to get liquidity due to the freeze
of liquidity in the financial markets.  Facing a much wider set of eventual
recipients for whom the 2004 Guidelines were not even applicable,66 to-
gether with the conclusions of the ECOFIN Counsel exhorting Member
States to help their national banking sector,67 the European Commission
ultimately decided to adopt an ad hoc general legal framework on the ba-
sis of 107.3(b).
3. Time Consistency
Notwithstanding criticism by Member States that considered them-
selves to be in a better position to deal with national bank bailouts,68 for-
mer Commissioner Kroes stood firmly in favor of the role of a
comprehensive competition policy in order to assure future economic re-
covery.69  Thus, a conscious balance of short-term and long-term effects
characterizes all four Communications approved by the Commission on
the basis of Article 107.3(b).
First, the Banking Communication70 addressing the criteria of compat-
ibility of government guarantees and recapitalizations was kept very much
in line with the 2004 Guidelines by establishing that these had to be non-
discriminatory, based on objective criteria, proportional, and limited in
time and scope in order to avoid moral hazard problems.  Additionally,
incentives were aligned through a minimum contribution secured by the
aid receiver or by the financial sector as well as by structural adjustment
measures.  On the basis of this instrument, nineteen guarantees for almost
C=  2747 billion were passed plus C=  402.8 billion in ad hoc guarantees.71
Some months later, the Recapitalization Communication72 brought ad-
ditional guidance on the compatibility of state aids to recapitalize banks
64. Commission Press Release, IP/07/1859 (Dec. 5 2007), available at  http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1859.
65. The Commission approved six rescuing aid measures in the banking sector (start-
ing with Northern Rock in December 2007) and one restructuring measure. Id.
66. Following the Guidelines, only firms in difficulties are eligible to be granted state
aid.
67. See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 50.
68. See Stephen Castle, European Regulators Again Revise Bank Subsidy Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/business/worldbusiness/03euro.html.
69. See Kroes, supra note 54.
70. Banking Communication (OJ 2008 C-270/8) (Oct. 2008).
71. Press Release, European Comm’n, State aid: Scoreboard shows continued trend
towards less and better targeted aid despite crisis-related spike (Jan. 12, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1635&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
72. Recapitalization Communication (OJ 2009 C-10/2) (Jan. 2009).
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on the basis of two main objectives: (1) to avoid the distortion of competi-
tion between institutions in different Member States and (2) to differenti-
ate between sound and unsound institutions.  Again in line with the 2004
Guidelines, the Communication required conditions that a minimum of 30
percent of the aid would come from private investors and would be
granted as close as possible to normal market conditions.  Following this
instrument, fourteen recapitalization measures amounting to C=  338.2 bil-
lion were granted, plus C=  164.9 billion ad hoc in nineteen different Mem-
ber States.73
Yet, additional risks associated with unsound institutions motivated a
third Communication on impaired assets,74 specifically addressed to
problems raised by these institutions such as moral hazard and the even-
tual need of a recurrent state intervention. Following the general princi-
ples set up by the previous instruments, i.e., necessity, proportionality and
minimization of distortions, the conditions laid down by this Communica-
tion acted as a means to encourage unsound institutions to exit the market
by calling for a full disclosure of their assets, together with a pragmatic
approach concerning the timeframe—a maximum of six months—as well
as assets that can be relieved.  Seven Member States used this instrument
to grant aid for an amount of C=  376 billion.75
Finally, the last step towards recovery was taken with the Restructur-
ing Communication76 setting up the basis to assure long-term stability in
the financial sector on the basis of three guiding principles.77  First, re-
structuring should lead to restoration of long-term viability without state
aids; second, restructuring should involve real contribution to the plan
from the beneficiaries themselves; and third, the restructuring aid has to
be accompanied by sufficient compensatory elements to prevent a distor-
tion of competition.  Member States had different obligations depending
on the amount of aid granted to an institution.  While in the case of sound
institutions the so-called Viability Plans will suffice, whenever more than 2
percent of the total risks weighted assets Restructuring Plans will be imple-
mented.  With a medium-long-term timeframe between two and five years,
such instruments imply not only a diagnosis of the financial institution in-
cluding stress tests of their business but also the eventual sale of the insti-
tution in question.78  As a central element to assure the actual recovery of
the European financial sector, this Communication’s fundamental objec-
tives are maintaining the credit flows, leveling the playing field between
73. Press Release, supra note 71.
74. Impaired Assets Communication (OJ 2009 C-72/1).
75. Press Release, supra note 71.
76. Restructuring Communication (OJ 2009 C-195/9).
77. Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, European Comm’n Responsible for Competi-
tion Policy, State Aid Rules Can Help Europe Exit Crisis (June 10, 2010) (transcript available
in the European Commission Press Release Database).
78. Both viability and restructuring plans will be closely monitored by the Commission
Communication.
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banks in different Member States as well as between beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries of public aids, avoiding subsidy races and thus retaining
both competitiveness and efficiency of EU financial institutions.
B. U.S. Responses
1. Coordination
In the United States, the financial crisis was characterized by one key
default (Lehman) and a wave of mergers between banks and other finan-
cial institutions, which individually and collectively raised competition is-
sues.  The three most significant mergers were those between Bank of
America and Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bear Stearns, and
Wells Fargo and Wachovia.  The financial institution merger story has to
be viewed against the backdrop of contemporaneous bank failures.  Be-
tween October 2000 and January of 2008, the FDIC recorded twenty-
seven bank failures.79  It recorded almost as many—twenty-five—in the
year 2008 alone and then a startling 139 in 2009.80  According to one
study, between 2007 and 2010, 318 U.S. commercial banks and savings in-
stitutions, about four percent of all banks operating at the end of 2006,
exited the market.81
A host of federal decision makers were involved in responding to the
crisis.  On the regulatory side, review of bank mergers and acquisitions
was fragmented between four different agencies—the Federal Reserve
Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, and Office of the Controller of the Currency—depending on the in-
corporation status of the relevant bank.82  Bank mergers are generally
exempt from premerger notification under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.83
The Antitrust Division plays an advisory role in exempt bank merger
transactions, analyzing the transaction under the Bank Merger Guidelines
and submitting a report to the reviewing regulatory agency.84
Apart from regulatory review, the other significant federal interven-
tion during the 2008–09 financial crisis was the Treasury Department’s se-
lective infusion of capital into the financial sector.  On October 14, 2008,
the U.S. government announced a series of initiatives to strengthen mar-
79. See Failed Bank List, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2011).
80. See id.
81. David C. Wheelock, Have Acquisitions of Failed Banks Increased the Concentra-
tion of the U.S. Banking Market?, 93 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 155, 155 (2011).
82. Jonathan A. Rich & Thomas G. Scriven, Bank Consolidation Caused by the Finan-
cial Crisis: How Should the Antitrust Division Review “Shotgun Marriages?”, ANTITRUST
SOURCE (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/Dec08_Rich12_22f.authcheckdam.pdf.
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(c)(7)–(8) (2000).
84. Rich & Scriven, supra note 82, at 2.
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ket stability and liquidity and shore up financial institutions.85  The pro-
gram’s centerpiece, the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”) enabled the Treasury Department to provide loans to troubled
financial institutions to prevent failure.
Decisions on allocation of TARP funds were largely at the discretion
of the Treasury.  No formal administrative or regulatory check was put in
place to determine the competitive impact of TARP interventions.  In
some instances, banks used TARP funds to acquire other banks, thereby
helping the cause of solvency but potentially exacerbating the problem of
concentration.86  Further, once the U.S. government became financially
invested in the TARP-assisted banks, it assumed a fiscal interest in ensur-
ing their survival.  As smaller banks have struggled to repay TARP loans,
the Treasury has encouraged acquisitions by larger banks on the condition
that the acquiring bank repay the Treasury.87
Given the fractured nature of decision-making on financial sector in-
tervention and the potentially conflicting goals of ensuring short-term sol-
vency, protecting federal fiscal exposure, and maintaining a competitive
landscape, the U.S. response presented a risk of poorly coordinating
macro and micro policy interests.  Nonetheless, there is little evidence that
substantial damage was done to the competitive landscape in the recent
crisis.  Despite the simultaneous exit of many smaller banks and the con-
solidation through merger of larger ones, relatively modest concentration
increases were reported in most local banking markets around the time of
the Financial Crisis.88
2. Systematic Approach
An early headline of the financial crisis was the U.S. government’s de-
cision not to shore up Lehman Brothers, resulting in the dramatic implo-
sion of a marquee investment bank with $650 billion in assets.  After
cutting Lehman loose, the Treasury used TARP funds to shore up other
large investment banks—Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Citibank, and
Goldman Sachs.  The result was a substantially altered investment banking
market.
More generally, the dispersion of TARP funds was largely left to the
discretion of the Treasury Department on a case-by-case basis.  The gov-
ernment used its discretion selectively to try to avoid cascading economic
85. Troubled Assert Relief Program (TARP) Information, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/tarpinfo.htm (last up-
dated Mar. 7, 2017).
86. See, e.g., Jennifer Yousfi, PNC Becomes First Bank to Utilize TARP Funds with
Acquisition of National City, MONEY MORNING (Oct. 24, 2008), http://moneymorning.com/
2008/10/24/troubled-assets-relief-program.
87. Andy Peters, Tarp Discounts Still Playing a Role in Bank Acquisitions, ON WALL
STREET (June 29, 2011), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/banks-consolidation-troubled-as-
set-relief-program-2674013-1.html.
88. See Wheelock, supra note 81.
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effects even while minimizing moral hazard.  Lehman was let go to teach
the market a lesson.  In the automobile sector, top administration officials
pondered the economic and political fallout of letting Chrysler go as
well.89
In general, the federal decisional matrix on bailouts played out as a
balancing of concerns over fiscal restraint, moral hazard, and prevention
of systemic collapses.  Relatively little attention seems to have been paid
to the competitive effects of selective industrial failure coupled with the
strengthening, through equity infusion and/or merger, of the surviving
firms.  To the extent that such considerations were taken into account, it
was on an ad hoc basis, without the check of any formal administrative or
institutional process.
3. Time Consistency
A crisis is no place for sedulous contemplation, particularly when sol-
vency and firm survival can lurch dramatically in days or even hours.  The
federal agencies responsible for scrutinizing financial sector mergers ac-
quitted themselves nobly by responding at breakneck speed.  All three of
the mega-mergers were given early termination under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act.90  In the case of Wells Fargo/Wachovia, the early termination
came two days after the Hart Scott filing.91
Recognizing the need for alacrity in crisis-period merger review, com-
mentators have noted the availability of certain procedures designed to
allow the immediate consummation of mergers, subject to later review and
correction for competitive concerns if necessary.  In particular, the Justice
Department has previously used “pocket decrees” which allow a merger to
close immediately subject to a consent decree permitting the government
to order divestitures at a later date if its investigation uncovers competi-
tive concerns.92
In the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis, the Justice Department did not
make use of pocket decrees or other conditional clearance mechanisms.
Its transactions clearance decisions were final.  Perhaps this reflects a con-
cern that placing any conditions on mergers might fatally spook already
spooked acquiring firms and thereby undermine pressing short-term sol-
vency and systemic failure worries.  On the other hand, one wonders how
high a discount rate on future competitive effects agencies should apply
89. See STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA AD-
MINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY (2010).
90. Notice 20081827: Bank of America Corporation; Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., FTC
EARLY TERMINATION NOTICES (Oct. 14, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-
notification-program/early-termination-notices/20081827.
91. Notice 20090021: Wells Fargo & Company; Wachovia Corporation, FTC, (Oct. 9,
2008), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/early-termination-
notices/20090021.
92. Rich & Scriven, supra note 82, at 7.
Spring 2018] Integrating Micro and Macro Policy Levers 219
during a crisis.  In the 2008–09 financial crisis, the United States seemed to
apply a steep discount rate.
CONCLUSION
During times of severe economic crisis, governmental interventions
have simultaneous and direct effects on both macro and micro industrial
factors.  As governments shore up some financial institutions through cap-
ital infusion and allow others to vanish into liquidation or else be acquired
by their stronger rivals, they influence the present and future courses of
the financial and real economies both systemically and locally.  These deci-
sions do not call for a simple trade-off between short-term and long-term
effects, between short-term stability and liquidity on the one hand and
long-run competitiveness on the other.  Rather, they entail managing a
variety of competing pressures and policy levers.
In this article, we have identified three particularly important dimen-
sions of governmental response during financial crises.  First, governments
have to coordinate the interventions of many different political and regu-
latory actors to ensure consistency between macro and micro objectives.
Second, they must take a systematic approach, or at least recognize that an
ad hoc approach designed to minimize future moral hazard can have seri-
ous repercussions for competitive balance.  Third, they need to ensure
time consistency—that is, to not so steeply discount future competitive im-
plications that dynamic and static costs of future enhancements of market
power swamp present stability and liquidity concerns.
A survey of the EU and U.S. responses to the recent financial crisis
reveals the challenges involved in managing the strategic complementarity
between macro and micro policy levers along the three key dimensions.
Perhaps surprisingly given Europe’s weaker federal structure, the Euro-
pean Union seemed to have a more streamlined institutional apparatus at
its disposal to coordinate actions by governmental decision-makers.
Through its state aid rules, the European Union also seemed to have a
stronger institutionalized check on selective and potentially anticompeti-
tive capital infusion.  By comparison, the U.S. approach appears relatively
ad hoc.  Finally, at least at a superficial level, the European Union also
seemed to employ a more deliberate approach to balancing short-term and
long-term objectives.
None of this is to say that European governments more successfully
deployed their policy levers than did their U.S. counterparts.  The rela-
tively uncoordinated and selectively applied U.S approach seems to have
produced little long-run damage in the form of enhanced market concen-
tration and reduced competitiveness.  Still, it would be desirable for
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to give serious thought to how,
in the next, inevitable crisis, they will deploy their strategic-complemen-
tary policy levers to maximize the speed and effectiveness of governmental
response even while preserving competitive landscapes.
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